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The Circuit Court for the District of Kansas has lately held,.
that a "boycott" by the members of trades unions or assemblies, (the term boycott being understood to mean,.
Boycott,
in law, a combination to inaugurate and maintain
Injunction,
Jurisdiction of a general proscription of articles manufactured by
Federal Court

the party against whom it is directed,) is unlawful,.
may
be
enjoined in equity; but that in such a suit a
and
federal court has no jurisdiction of individual defendants who.
are citizens of the same state with the complainant, nor can the
association be sued as a body, or members thereof be enjoined.
who are not parties to the record: Oxley Stave Co. v. Coopers"
International Union of Nortik America, 72 Fed. Rep. 695.
The Supreme Court of Illinois, in Love v. People, 43 N. E..
Rep. 71o, has lately rebuked a most flagrant example of a.
frequent abuse of the detective profession. It ap-Burglary,
peared on the trial that there had been numerous,
Crime
Induced by
burglaries committed in a town, and that the.
Detective

authorities employed a detective to discover the
criminals. This detective became acquainted with the defend-ants, spent money on them, loaned them money, and repeatedlysuggested to them that they should engage in burglary as a.
means of raising money. At last he made arrangements with.
one Hoag to put marked money in his safe, with the under-.
standing that it should be burglarized, and one night, having
made the defendants drunk, he led them to Hoag's office,.
opened the office and the safe himself, and took out the money
and handed it to the defendants, who took it, and afterwards.
divided it among themselves. The court held that these facts
did not warrant a conviction for burglary, and discharged the-defendants.
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The portion of the opinion which discusses the actions of
-the detective is well worth quoting. " Day after day and
-night after night his efforts were not directed to the arrest of
.criminals, but his mental powers and robust health, with the
use of money, were directed towards an effort to make crimi-nals of these young men; with' plenty to drink and smoke and
eat at his expense, he sought to undermine and dazzle their
mental and moral strength, and lead them into the commission
of crime. Ambitious, doubtless, to succeed in his chosen pursuit, with him the conviction of those theretofore guilty, was less
an object than that he might fasten on some one the commission of a crime. If he could make the criminal, and induce
the commission of the crime, and cause the arrest of the actor,
or throw around him a web of circumstances that would lead
to conviction, it would redound to the glory of his chief, and
cause his advancement. With him the end justified the
means, and the reputation of the agency to which he belonged
and his own advancement were apparently his object. Such
means and agents are more dangerous to the welfare of society
than are the crimes they were intended to detect, and the
criminals they were to arrest."
In Chzicago & Alto
Carriers,
PAssongers In
Excess of

Capacity of

Cars,
Degree of Care
Required

R. R. Co. v. Dmser, 43 N. E. Rep.

698, the Supreme Court of Illinois has lately held,
that when the number of passengers who have a
right to take a certain train is in excess of its
capacity, the company must exercise the same
degree of care, vigilance and forethought in pro-

viding additional cars, as it is bound to exercise in its other
relations to its passengers.
A railroad or sleeping car company is not liable for the
death of a passenger at the hands of an intruder upon the
cars for the purpose of robbery, in the absence
Injury to
Passenger by of evidence to show that they or their employes
Third Person, knew of the danger impending, or of circumLiability
stances to arouse their suspicion:
Connzell v.
Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., (Court of Appeals of Virginia,)
24 S. E. Rep. 467.
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In a recent case in the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine,.
Eaton v. Mclntyre, 34 At. Rep. 525, the incidents of the contract of carriage contained in a mileage book wereRailroads,
Mileage - briefly discussed. The plaintiff handed his mileBooks, rage-book
to the conductor, and requested him to
Taking Fare
take his fare from* the back part of it. The
coupons were numbered in regular order from front to back,
and a portion of the leaves in the back part only had been
detached, leaving six or eight coupons that were a part of the
last leaf. The conductor took these coupons and the rest of'
the fare from the front of the book. The passenger thereupon sued him for the conversion of the book. This claim the
court set aside as absurd, holding that mileage books contain
a contract between the railroad and the passenger, to which,
the latter affixes his name, and expressly provide that the
coupons shall be detached by the conductor; this provision
fairly implies that the conductor has the right to determinefrom what part or parts of the book the coupons shall be
taken; that the passenger had no right to determine from
what part of the book the fare should be taken; and that the
conductor, in detaching coupons from the front part of thebook, contrary to the passenger's request, did not exercise an
unlawfuf dominion over the book, and was not guilty of aconversion of it.
In Elder v. Whitesides, 72 Fed. Rep. 724, the Circuit Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana has decided, following
Hafoan v. Blindell, 56 Fed. Rep, 696, 1893, and.
Conspiracy,
Injunction
Arthur v. Oakes, 63 Fed. Rep. 310, 1894, that.
a conspiracy to prevent the loading or unloading of a vessel,
except by such labor as may be acceptable to the defendants,
may be enjoined, though no particular overt act or acts against
that particular vessel is alleged or proved ; that it is no ground
for refusing an injunction to restrain conspirators from doing
irreparable damage to complainant's property rights that some
of the acts enjoined would subject the wrongdoers to a criminal
prosecution ; and that a suit by an alien against citizens of the
United States to enjoin a conspiracy to prevent the loading or

PROGRESS OF THE LAW.

unloading of the complainant's ship is within the equity jurisdiction of the federal courts, independent of any question as
to interference with interstate or foreign commerce.

The Supreme Court of California has set the seal of its
approval upon that unbounded license of the press which,
Constitutional while it may possibly be the palladium of our
liberties, is at the same time doing more than any
Law,
Freedom
other factor to debauch public morals and obstruct
of the Press

the cause of justice. During the Durrant trial in
San Francisco, a fellow named Daily advertised that he would
bring out in a theatre of that city a putative play entitled
"The Crime of a Century." Durrant then presented an affidavit to the court setting forth that the said play was based
upon the facts of his case as established at the preliminary
examination and the coroner's inquest, and that the production
of that play during the progress of his trial would be an interference with the administration of justice, and deprive him of
a fair and impartial trial. The court granted this motion; but
the Supreme Court reversed it, holding that it had no jurisdiction to take such action : Daily v. Superior Court of City
and County of San Francisco, 44 Pac. Rep. 458.
Justices McFarland and Semple dissented, with a greater
show of reason than those who concurred in the majority
opinion. If that is correct, then no court has the power to,
preserve its proceedings intact from the defiling touch of the
scavengers of the press and the variety shows.
According to a recent decision of the Supreme Court of the
United States, a State statute which requires a telegraph comInterstate pany to transmit and deliver despatches with
CommerCe,
impartiality, good faith, and due diligence, under
Penalty for

Failure to
Deliver

the penalty of one hundred dollars in each case,
(Act Ga. 1887, Oct. 22: P. L. I i I,) is not void,
Telegraph
Message
as to messages coming from without the state, as
an interference with interstate commerce, in the absence of any
lcgislation by Congiess on that subject: Western Union Tel.
Co. v. James, i6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 934.
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The Supreme Court of Nebraska, in Le Hane v. State,
66 N. W. Rep. 1017, has recently passed npon a rather
unusual question. An attorney applied to a trial
Contempt,
Appncation judge for an order transferring a cause to another
b[r Another Ju
judge for trial, because of prejudice on the part of
Judge
the former. He supported the application by proof that he
had published a libel of and concerning the judge to whom
the application was made, and attached a copy of the libelous
publication to his affidavit. The application itself was made
in respectful language, and it did not appear that it was not
presented in a respectful manner. The judge, thinking this an
excellent opportunity to get square with the attorney, forthwith adjudged him guilty of contempt, and sentenced him to
fine and imprisonment. This the Supreme Court held that he
had no right to do, summarizing the law on the subject as
follows:
"A party to an action, or counsel, may, in good faith,
apply to a judge, before whom ,a case would naturally come
on for hearing, to have another judge try the case, because of
prejudice on the part of the first judge which would prevent
an impartial trial. Such an application, when presented in
respectful language and in a respectful manner, is not, in
itself, a contempt of court. Such an application must be
supported by proof, and the tendering of proof in support
thereof is not a contempt of court when offered, in good faith,
for the purpose of establishing the judge's prejudice, and not
for the purpose of reflecting upon his honor, integrity, or
character. When such proof is of a documentary character,
the proceeding is not rendered contemptuous, when it is so
conducted in good faith, merely because documents introduced
do reflect upon the character of the judge, and even though
their original publication might have been contemptuous or
criminal; and, finally, in a summary proceeding for contempt,
the court cannot take notice of such original publication, or of
such improper motive in making the application. To reach
these matters the proceeding must be on information as for
c6nstructive contempt."
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The Court of Appeals of New York, in Carleton v. Loinbard,43 N. E. Rep. 422, has recently rendered a decision of
great interest to the mercantile world. The deContract,
Latent Defect, fendants in that case-a corporation engaged in
Liability
refining crude petroleum for sale and exportcontracted in writing to manufacture and deliver to the plaintiffs, for shipment, oil of a certain brand, color, and fire test.
Pursuant to the rules of the Produce Exchange, which were
made a part of the contract, the plaintiffs appointed an inspector, who certified that the oil delivered was of the brand, color,
and test contracted for. These rules also provided that the
acceptance of the oil by the buyer's inspector should be an
acknowledgment that the oil was in accordance with the
contract. The court held that under this contract the defendant was bound to deliver oil free from latent defects, growing
out of the process of manufacture, which would render it
unmerchantable at the time and place of delivery, and which
could be avoided by the use of reasonable care; and that this
obligation of the defendant survived the acceptance of the oil
by the inspector, if the latent defect was such as would not
appear upon an inspection to ascertain whether oil accepted
corresponded to that described in the contract.
According to a recent decision of the Supreme Court of the
United States, an order of court making a call or assessment
Corporations, upon all stockholders of a corporation who have
Call on Shares not paid their shares in full is simply such a call
by Order of

Court,
Effect

as the directors might have made before the matter
was brought within the court's jurisdiction, and is

not a judgment against any particular stockholder, so as to be
entitled to "full faith and credit" in the courts of another
state, where an action is brought against a stockholder to
recover the amount of the assessment on his shares. In such
an action the defendant may set up any defence which he
might have made to an action on the subscription contract:
Great Western Tel. Co. v. Pardy, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 8.Io.
In a late case in New York, involving the validity of the election of the officers of a corporation, it appeared that printed
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ballots had been prepared containing the names of
those candidates who had been previously placed in
nomination,-among them, a candidate for secretary. Another
candidate was nominated for the position, and his name was
directed to be written on all the ballots in a space left for that
purpose. In casting the ballots the greater number of those
who voted erased one of the two names; but two ballots
were cast containing both names, with neither erased, and discarding these ballots, neither nominee had enough to elect.
Another ballot was thereupon taken; and the court held this
to have been correct, as the written name on the two ballots
rejected could not be considered as controlling the printed one
in indicating the choice of the voter: People v. Pangburn,
(Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, First
Department,) 38 N. Y. Suppl. 217.
Judge McAdam, of the Supreme Court of New York, at
Trial Term for New York County, has lately held that the
Failure to File limitation of the action to enforce the liability of
Annual
directors of a corporation for their failure to file
Report,
Election of
Officers

Liability of
Directors

the annual report required by law, begins to run
from the time the debt first became due and

enforceable by action, and that the operation of the statute
cannot be suspended by renewals or extensions granted without consultation with, or the knowledge of the director sought
to be charged: Blake v. Clausen, 38 N. Y. Suppl. 5 14.
The Supreme Court of Georgia, following the settled rule,
has lately held, that there is no reason which excludes a
Officer as director or other agent of a corporation from testiWitness,
fying as a witness in a case to which the corporation
Transactions
with
Decedent

is a party, concerning transactions had between that
director or agent in behalf of the corporation and

another person since deceased, whose executor or administrator is the other party to the case: Ullman v. Brunswick
Title Guaranty & Loan Co., 24 S. E. Rep. 409.
According to a recent decision of the Supreme Court of
North Carolina, an agreement between stockholders holding a
PoolingStock, majority of the shares to pool their stock by
Public Policy transferring it to trustees, and authorizing them to
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-vote all such stock at corporate meetings, and to pledge it as
-collateral for loans, is void, as against public policy: Harvey
v. Linville Imp. CO., 24 S. E. Rep. 489.
An examination of the case will show that the language of
this decision goes too far. Such an agreement, according to
the best authority, is not void, but simply revocable at the
will of any party thereto; and that was all that was necessary
to the decision of the case in hand.
The Supreme Court of the United States has lately passed
upon two questions which, though at no time in great doubt,
it was well to have finally settled. The first of
Railroads,
these is, that a holder of railroad stock, issued to
Rights of
Stockholders,
Forfeited
Land Grants,
Transfer to
other
Company,
Rights
of Creditors

him as full paid, in payment of undisputed debts
due to a construction company, whose claims
have been assigned to him, takes it free of all
trusts or obligations in favor of the company
issuing it, and is under no duty to that company

-or to its other stockholders to continue in the ownership thereof
for the purpose of facilitating pending regulations for the transfer
-of the control of the company to another railroad company,
but may sell the same to a rival company also seeking control,
or to whomsoever he sees fit, and for any price obtainable;
the second, that when an act of the legislature simply takes
away from one railroad company lands previously granted to it,
because of its entire failure to comply with the conditions of
the grant, and bestows them on another company, the courts
cannot hold, in the absence of any provision in the statute to
that effect, that the lands were transferred burdened with a
continuing obligation for the debts of the former company, for
the creditors of that company could have no legal or equitable
claims on lands thus forfeited: Farmers'Loan & TYnst Co. v.
Chicago, P. & S. Ry. Co., I6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 917.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, extending the principle enunciated in Goldcy v. l31orning News, 156 U. S. 518,
Corporations, 1895, affirming 42 Fed. Rep. i 12, 189o (see 34
Suits Against, A.i. L. REG. (N. S.) 68o), has decided that nothVenue,
Service

ing short of express statutory permission will
.authorize the commencement of an action against a railroad
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company for personal injuries in a county where it has nooffice, agent, or property, by service on an officer temporarily
within that county: Bailey v. Williamsport & N. R. R. Co.,
34 Atl. Rep. 556.
The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas has gravely
decided, that an information charging a defendant with carryCriminalLaw, ing "brass knuckles" is supported by proof of'
Carrying
the carrying of knuckles made of any metal or
Weapons,
Brass
hard substance, the kind of metal of which they
Knuckles
are composed not being an element of the offence;
for "this court judicially knows that ' brass knuckles' may be
composed of metal other than brass, as steel, ii'on, &c:" Louis
v. State, 35 S. W. Rep. 377.
In Gibson v. State of Ak-ississi,
I6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 904, the
Supreme Court of the United States has recently decided, that
Ex Post Facto a constitutional provision, which required all grand
Law,
and petit jurors to be qualified electors, able to
Selection of
oJurors
oread and write, and enjoined on the legislature the
duty of providing by law for listing and drawing
persons so qualified, but declared that, until otherwise provided
by law, all crimes should be tried as though no change had
been made, (Const. Miss. 1890, §§ 264, 283,) went into effect
immediately on its adoption, so far as the qualifications of
jurors were concerned; that one who committed a crime after
the adoption of the constitution, but before the legislature
passed a new jury law, could be tried, after the passage of
such a law, by a jury selected under its provisions; and that,
as the new law did not aggravate the crime previously cominitted, or inflict a greater punishment, or alter the rules of
evidence, its application to the trial of the accused did not
make it an er postfacto law.
In In re Fleming, 38 N. Y. Suppl. 6I i, the Supreme Court
of New York, at Special Term for New York County, has
Descent and held, in accordance with the decision in Riggs v.
Distribution, Palmer, 115 N. Y. 5o6, 1889, that when an heirMurder of
has been indicted for the murder of his ancestor,
Ancestor
his petition to compel payment to him of his dis-
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tributive share of the estate will not be heard until the indictment has been tried.
In JfcKay v. Southern Belt Telephone & Telegrapl Co., 19
So. Rep. 695, the Supreme Court of Alabama has lately ruled,
that when two wires charged with electricity, mainElectric
tained concurrently by different parties, are so
Railway,
Wires,
situated with reference to each other that one is
Negligence
likely to fall across the other, and produce dangerous consequences, this danger being within the common
knowledge of both parties, it is the duty of each to abate the
dangerous condition; and if they fail to do so, both are liable
for accidents resulting therefrom.
A street car company which uses electricity is bound to
employ the best mechanical contrivances and inventions; and
evidence that a particular trolley wire has been the
Proof of
Similar
subject of frequently recurring accidents is adAccidents
missible, as showing that the company had notice
of its unsafe condition: Richmond Rj'. & El. Co. v. Bowles,
(Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia,) 24 S. E. Rep. 388.
A railroad ticket in such form as to show that an innocent
holder of it is entitled to a ride over a railroad is property that
may be embezzled; and the indictment therefor
Embezzle.
ment,
may charge in the same court the embezzlement
Rallroad
Tickets,
Indictment

of fifty pieces of paper, each of a certain stated
value, and of fifty railroad tickets of like value:

Coumnonwealt/t v. Parker,(Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts,) 43 N. E. Rep. 499.
The Supreme Court of Illinois, in two recent cases, has held
that death by accidental poisoning is not within the provisions
of a policy insuring against death from injuries
Insurance,
received through " external, violent and accidental
Life,
Death by
means," unless it is caused from " taking poison,"
Poison

"suicide," &c.: Travelers' hisuraceCo. v. Dunlap,
43 N. E. Rep. 765, affirming 59 Ill. App. 515; or one which
provides that "this nuisance shall not be held to extend to

.390
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. . . . poison in any way. taken, administered, absorbed, or
inhaled.:" Metropolitan Accident Assn. v. Froiland,43 N. E.
Rep. 766, affirming 59 Ill. App. 522 ; since in each policythe
exception extends only to poison taken by the voluntary,
intelligent act of the insured; and that the insurer will be
liable in both cases.
The same court has also held, that the killing of the
insured by an insane beneficiary, under circumInsurance,
Life,
stances which would constitute murder if the
Murder of
beneficiary were sane, does not cause a forfeitInsured
by Insane
ure of the policy: Holdorn v. Grand Lodge of
Beneficiary
Ancient Order of United Workmen, 43 N. E. Rep.
772 ; reversing 51 Ill. App.

200.

In Hennington v. Georgia (not yet reported), the Supreme
Court of the United States has rendered a highly important
Interstate
decision with reference to the power of the States
Commerce,

Prohibition of to pass statutes affecting
Sunday
Trains,
Power of State

interstate commerce.
The case in hand was a prosecution under a

statute of the State of Georgia, which made it a
misdemeanor to run freight trains (with a few exceptions) on
Sunday. This was urged by the defence to be in conflict
with the clause of the Constitution giving Congress power to
regulate commerce among the States, but the court refused to
adopt this view, and affirmed the decision of the Supreme
,Court of Georgia, holding that the act in question was a
proper police regulation, and therefore not obnoxious to the
constitutional provision, unless it should come into conflict
with congressional legislation on the subject.
After citing numerous authorities, Mr. Justice Harlan summarizes the principles that governed the decision in the following masterly manner:
"These authorities make it clear that the legislative enactments of the States passed under their admitted police powers,
and having a real relation to the domestic peace, order, health,
and safety of their people, but which, by their necessary operation, affect to some extent, or for a limited time, the conduct
of commerce among the States, are yet not invalid by force
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:alone of the grant of power to Congress to regulate such
commerce, and, if not obnoxious to some other constitutional,
provision or destructive of some right secured by the fundamental law, are to be respected in the courts of the Union
until they are superseded and displaced by some act of Congress passed in execution of the power granted to it by the
,Constitution. Local laws of the character mentioned have
their source in the powers which the States reserved and never
surrendered to Congress, of providing for the public health,
the public morals, and the public safety, and are not, within
the meaning of the Constitution, and considered in their own
nature, regulations of interstate commerce simply because, for
a limited tinie or a limited extent, they cover the field occupied
by those engaged in such commerce. The statute of Georgia
is not directed against interstate commerce. It establishes a
rule of civil conduct applicable alike to all freight trains,
domestic as well as interstate. It applies to the transportation
of interstate freight the same rule precisely that it applies to
the transportation of domestic freight. And it places the business of transporting freight in the same category as all other
secular business. It simply declares that, on and during the
day fixed by law as a day of rest for all the people within the
limits of the State from toil and labor incident to their callings,
the transportation of freight shall be suspended,
We are of opinion that such a. law, although in a limited
degree affecting interstate commerce, is not for that reason a
needless intrusion upon the domain of Federal jurisdiction,
nor strictly a regulation of interstate commerce, but, considered
in its own nature, is an ordinary police regulation designed to
secure the well-being and to promote the general welfare of
the people within the State by which it was established, and
therefore, not invalid by force alone of the Constitution of the
United States."
In Pletts v. Beattie, [1896] I Q. B. 519, the Queen's Bench
Division of England has recently passed upon an interesting
intoxicating question arising under the laws regulating the sale
Liquors,
of intoxicating liquors. The defendant, Pletts,
Sale
who was duly licensed to sell beer and ale in one
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borough, sent a drummer around through other.boroughs toobtain orders. The drummer gave to the customers on whom
he called a printed and stamped postal card, addressed to the
defendant, which read as follows:
Dear Sir,Please supply me weekly as under until further notice
I assent to the appropriation by you to this order at yourbrewery of goods of the above description and in a deliverable
state.
Yours Truly,
The blank space on the card was filled in with the description of the liquors wanted, and then mailed to the defendants.
In filling one of such orders, the defendant's carter selected at
the brewery six bottles of the liquor ordered, one of which he
labeled with the customer's name and address, and placed them
in a box with six other bottles for another customer, one of
which was also labeled. This box, with others, was then
placed on a wagon and finally delivered at the customer's
house, where they were paid for on delivery. Upon these
facts, the court held, distinguishing Pleas v. Campbell, [1895]
2 Q. B. 229, that there was a complete sale and appropriation
of the goods at the brewery, and the defendant could not be
convicted (under § 3 of the Licensing Act of 1872,) of selling
intoxicating liquor at a place where he was not authorized by
his license to sell the same.
The Court of Appeals of New York, following the weight of
reason and authority, has decided, in People v. Adelphi Club
that the
Social club of City of Albany, 43 N. E. Rep. 410,
dispensing of liquors by a social club with a
limited and select membership, organized for a legitimate purpose, to which the furnishing of liquors to its members on
payment therefor is merely incidental, is not a sale, within the
meaning of a statute (Laws N. Y. 1892, c. 401, § 3 1,) providing that any person who, without a license, shall sell spirituous
liquors, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
It has been hcld by the Circuit Court for the Western Dis-
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trict of Texas, that a statute imposing an occupation tax of
firm or
License Tax, five hundred dollars on every person,
association engaged in selling "the Sunday Sun,
Interstate
the Kansas City Sunday Sun, or other publicaCommerce
"tions of like character," being applicable to all persons,
whether residents of the state or not, engaged in selling "publications of like character" with those specifically mentioned,
-is not a discrimination either against the person or the property
-of the owners of the publications named, and is therefore not
invalid, as a regulation of interstate commerce: Preston v.
.Firnthy, 72 Fed. Rep. 850.
In Chesapeake & Ohio Ry, Co. v. Le-sh1, 24 S.E. Rep. 385,
.the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia has recently decided,
Jaster and that chalk marks, meaning "out of order," placed
on cars to inform the road from which they were
Servant,
-Contributory
Neg!igence,

Brakeman

received that the cars were out of order when
received, and that the defendant company was

therefore not liable for their repair, are not, as matter of law,
-notice to a brakeman that the bumpers are defective, so as to
prevent a recovery for his death, caused by the defects therein
,vhile coupling the cars.
The Supreme Court of the United States has definitely
-Tanged itself on the side of the master in the dispute over the
question of what constitutes a fellow-servant, It
FellowServant, holds that the general rule is that those who
Vie-prnipl enter the service of a common master thereby
become engaged in a common service, and are fellow-servants;
that a vice-principal is only one who has charge of a distinct
department of the service, with entire control therein; and
that mere superiority of position, with the right to direct and
,control those working with him, does not prevent the servant
go in control from being the fellow-servant of those working
under him. Applying these manufactured principles, the
court decided that neither a gang boss on a railroad (Northern
Pac. R. R. Co. v. Peterson, 16 Sup, Ct. Rep. 843, reversing 51
Fed, Rep. 182) nor a section foreman (ANorthern Pac. R. R.
,Co.v. Charless, I6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 848, reversing 51 Fed. Rep.
562) is a vice-principal, but that they are merely fellow-ser-
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vants of those under them. Chief Justice Fuller and Justices;
Field and Harlan dissented in each case.
Under the Laws of Texas of 1893, p. 120, which require as
essentials of the relation of fellow-servants that they (I) beengaged in the common service, (2) in the sameFellowServants,

Railroad

grade of employment, (3)be working together at.

the same time and place, and (4)be working to a
common purpose, an engineer and a switchman, who aremembers of the same switching crew, engaged in switching
cars under a common foreman, are fellow-servants, though
employed and discharged by different superiors: Gulf, C. &
S. F. Ry. Co. v. Warner, (Supreme Court of Texas), 35 S. W..
Employes

Rep. 364.

The Court of Civil Appeals of Texas has lately held, that a
city, incorporated under the general law of that state, by the
voluntary act of its inhabitants, which, under that.
Municipal
Corporations, law, for its own advantage and profit, voluntarily
Defective
Waterworks, maintains a system of waterworks for general pur-Liability for poses, including the putting out of fires, is liable
Loss by Fire

to a patron of the works, for hire, whose
property-

is consumed in consequence of the negligence of the city in
permitting the works to get out of repair, and, allowing thewater in the stand-pipe to get so low as not to afford sufficient
pressure to throw the water from hydrants upon the burning
property: Lenzen v. City of Nezv Braunfels, 35 S.W. Rep. 341.
The Appellate Court of Indiana has decided, that the fact
that an ordinance provides that the funds derived by way of
fines for its violation should enure to the use of'
Liability to
the municipality does not enable the latter to lawIndemnify
Officer
fully undertake to indemnify a police officer for
any damages recovered against him for an attempt to enforceit; and that when a police officer is sued for false imprisonment for arresting a person for violation of an. ordinance, the
municipality is not liable for the failure of its officers to makea defence to the suit, so as to render it liable to the officer on
the recovery of a default judgment against him:. aughtman"
v. Waterloo, 43 N. E. Rep. 176.
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If a partially decayed tree is allowed to stand in such a
position that, if it should fall, it would damage the house of
another, and the owner of the lot on which it
Negligence,
Dangerous stands neglects to remove it, though notified that
it is decayed and dangerous, he will be liable for
Premises,
Decayed Tree
damages caused by the fall of the tree
on the
plaintiff's house during a gale: Gibson v. Denton, (Supreme
Court of New York, Appellate Division, Third Department,).
38 N. Y. Suppl. 554.
The Supreme Court of North Carolina has lately ruled
that an act (Acts N. C. 1895, c. i 16,) imposing a license tax.
on peddlers, and declaring any person carrying a
Peddlers,
License Tax, wagon, cart or buggy for the purpose of exhibiting
or delivering any wares or merchandise, to be a.
Interstate
Commerce
peddler, is not void, as an interference with interstate commerce, as applied to a foreign corporation, there
being no discrimination against non-residents in favor of citizens of the state: Wrougkt Iron Range Co. v. Carver, 24 S. E.,
Rep. 352.
This seems erroneous, in view of the decision in Brennan v..
Titusville, 153 U. S. 289, 1894.
The Supreme Court of Iowa has ruled, in accordance with
the weight of reason and principle, that the fact that a physician has been guilty of negligence in the treatment
Physicians,
Malpractice, of his patient, resulting in damages to the latter,.
Recovery of
Compensation does not necessarily prevent his recovering any
for Servic compensation whatever for his services; but the
amount of his recovery, if any, depends on the amount of'
damages suffered because of his negligence: Whitesell v. Hill,
66 N. W. Rep. 894.
In Pear-sallv. Great NorthernRy. Co., I6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 705,
the Supreme Court of the United States has recently decided,
against the dissent of Justices Field and Brewer,
Railroads,
(i) That a contract by which one railroad agrees
Control of
Competing
Road,
Vested Rights

to guaranty the bonds of a parallel, competing
road, in consideration of which half the stock of'

the latter road is to be transferred to the stockholders of the
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former road, or to a trustee for their use, is within the prohibition of Laws Minn. 1874, C. 29, which provides that no railroad shall consolidate with, lease, purchase, or in any way
control, any parallel or competing line; and (2) That a general
power given a railroad by its charter, to consolidate with, purchase, lease, or acquire the stock of other roads, may, while it
remains unexecuted, be limited by the legislature to cases
where the other roads are not parallel or competing, without
impairing any vested right.
According to another decision of the same court, a constitutional prohibition against the consolidation of one railroad
with a parallel or competing road, is not an interference with
the power of Congress over interstate commerce: Louisville
& N. R. R. Co. v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep.
714; affirming 31 S. W. Rep. 476.
In Gibson v. State of Mississippi i6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 904, the
Supreme Court of the United States has lately held, following
Neal v. Delaware, 103 U. S. 370, i88o, that when
Removal of
Causes
the constitution and laws of a state, as interpreted
by its highest court, contain no provisions preventing the
enforcement of rights secured by any law of the United States
for the protection and enforcement of the equal rights of all
citizens thereof, the possibility that, during the trial of a particular case, a state court may not respect and enforce the
right to the equal protection of the laws, constitute no ground
for removing the prosecution to a federa1 court in advance of
the trial ; and therefore the fact that the officers charged with
the selection of jurors purposely exclude colored citizens from
jury service on account of their color, is no. ground for the
removal of a prosecution against a colored man to a federal
court, when the state laws do not provide for any such discrimination.
The Supreme Court of Louisiana has given a very sensible
decision in a suit for slander. The defendant in the case, a
woman eighty years old, was the lessor of the
Slander,I
When not
plaintiff, and in the course of a dispute between
Actionable
them over some matters relating to the tenancy,
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she applied to him several opprobrious epithets. These the
court refused to consider actionable, saying," We are disposed
to regard them as the irate and impulsive utterances of an old
woman, whose only means of defence against a fancied or real
wrong, which she had suffered at the hands of the plaintiff, was
an unruly and mischievous tongue. In this view of the case,
we are of the opinion that the plaintiff's damages are more
imaginary than real:" Mihojeviclh v. Bodechtel, 19 So. Rep.
672.

The Court of Appeals of Kentucky has carried to its logical
conclusion of absurdity the doctrine of the sacred character of
an enrolled bill, before which so many courts have
Statutes,
recently fallen on their knees with all the superEnactments,
as
Journals
stitious reverence of a fetich worshipper. It holds
Evidence
that when a bill is once properly enrolled and signed by the
presiding officer of each of the two houses, and signed and
approved by the governor, it cannot be impeached by reference
to the journals of either house to show that its mode of enactment was not in conformity to all constitutional requirements:
Lafferty v. Huffman, 35 S. W. Rep. 123.
Comment on this decision is useless. If it is the law (and
no other court has yet held it to be so,) then the presiding
officers, and not the houses, are the real law-makers; and
nothing on earth can prevent them, and the governor, from
conspiring to enact, by themselves 'alone, any legislation they
choose. Vogue la galere!
According to a recent.decision of the Court of Appeals of
Kansas, Northern Department, when a mortgage is taken
it shall be
Subrogation, upon land with the understanding that
a first lien thereon, and that the money to be
Paymentof
First
Mortgage

loaned on the mortgage is to be applied by the
mortgagee to the payment and discharge of a prior encumbrance on the same land, and it is so applied, the mortgagee
will be subrogated to the rights of the prior encumbrancer
whose debt was so discharged, when it is equitable to do so,
although there was, before the discharge of the prior encumbrance, a second mortgage on the land, of which the subse-
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quent mortgagee had no actual knowledge or notice: Traders'
Bank v. Myers, 44 Pac. Rep. 292.
In In re Wtliting, 38 N. Y. Suppi. 13 1, the Supreme Court
of New York, Fifth Department, has rendered a curious deSuccession cision, to the effect that bonds of a foreign corporation, owned by a non-resident, and kept on deposit
Tax,
Bonds of
Foreign

for safe keeping merely with a safe deposit cornin New York, are liable to a succession tax,
of
the
owner. The vice of the decision consists
on the death
in assuming that the state had jurisdiction of the bonds;
whereas, under the facts, it could have none.
Corporation pany

In an action to recover damages for the infringement of a
trade-mark, the plaintiff may show a falling off of his custom
trade-mark by
Trade-Mark, concurrent with the first use of the
Infringement, the defendant, it being for the jury to say whether
Damages
that use was the cause of the diminution: Shaw
v.

'ling, (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,) 34 Atl. Rep. 446.

It has been recently held by the Circuit Court for the
Southern District of California, that where a bill in equity
Investor PubTrade Names, alleged that the complainant, the
many
years
published a
had
for
lishing
Company,
Similar
Corporate
trade journal called "The United States Investor,"
Names,
Unfair

Competition

which acquired a high reputation and large circulation in the United States and other countries;

that the defendant, the Investor Publishing Company of California, had begun the publication of a similar paper, called
• The Investor," at the head of the editorial column of which
it placed the words, " Published by the Investor Publishing
Company; and that these acts of the defendant had caused
confusion in the complainant's business, diverted its trade and
caused it damage ;-that the bill stated a case for equitable
relief, and a demurrer thereto should be overruled: Investor
Pub. Co. of Massachusetts v. Dobinson, 72 Fed. Rep. 603.
The owner of a process or invention for manufacturing an
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-article, which was kept secret from all but confidential employes,
Trade Secrets, may restrain former employes from disclosing or
Use by
using in a rival establishment their knowledge
Employes,
InJunction

thereof, acquired while occupying such confiden.tial relation; and it is immaterial that there was no written
contract between them, or that, at the commencement of the
employment, the employes were minors, and performed comparatively unimportant duties : Little v. Gallus, (Supreme Court
of New York, Appellate Division, Fourth Department,) 38 N. Y.
Suppl. 487. See 34 A,%i. L. REG..(N. S.) 26.
In Stanley v. Schwalby, I6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 754, the Supreme
Court of the United States has reversed the decision of the
United States, Court of Civil Appeals of Texas (29 S. W. Rep.
Suits Against 9o; see 34 Aix. L. REG. (N. S.) 152), holding that
a judgment for plaintiffs in an action against hrmy officers in
possession of land used as a fort, in which the plaintiffs claimed
a one-third interest, was a judgment directly against the
United States and against their property, and not merely
against their officers, and therefore came within the rule
which declares that no suit can be maintained against the
United States, or their property, without the express authority
of Congress, and that such a judgment must be set aside.
Percolating waters belong absolutely to the owner of the
soil; and his title thereto is not affected by the
Waters
and Water- fact that an impervious stratum beneath, on which
courses,
Percolating
Waters

the porous stratum containing the water rests in
close contact, diverts the course of percolation to

and over adjoining land, into a natural stream: Gould v. Eaton,
(Supreme Court of California,) 44 Pac. Rep. 319.
According to a recent decision of the Supreme Court of
Illinois, the facts that a testator was a spiritualist, and had,
prior to the date of his will, been induced through
Will,
Testamentary that belief to do many strange things, (inter alia,
Capacity,
Belief In
Spiritualism

making unreasonable dispositions of his property,)
were insufficient to invalidate the will o0 the

ground of mental incapacity, when it appeared that he was

400

PROGRESS OF THE LAW.

otherwise of sound mind, and that the disposition of his property made by his will was such as any person of sound mind
might be expected to make, and there was no evidence that in
making it he was influenced in the slightest degree by his
spiritualistic belief: WMipple v. Eddy, 43 N. E. Rep. 789.
This subject is fully discussed in 31 A-i. L. REG. (N. S.) 569.
A witness cannot be compelled to give testimony tending to
incriminate himself, on the ground that a prosecution for the
offence is barred by limitation, unless it is affirmaWitness,
Incriminating tively shown that no prosecution is pending against
him: Lanison v. Boyden, (Supreme Court of IlliTestimony
nois,) 43 N. E. Rep. 78 1.

